Striking a Workable Balance: Labor Provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership by Robertson, Raymond
Striking a Workable 
Balance 
 
Labor Provisions in the  
Trans-Pacific Partnership 
RAYMOND ROBERTSON 
Bush School of Government and Public Service 
VOLUME 6 | ISSUE 7 | 2015 
Trade agreements have extended their reach far beyond 
simply reducing tariffs. One of the most controversial 
dimensions of modern trade agreements are labor 
standards. This brief explores the background and 
potential impact of labor standards in trade agreements, 
generally, and in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), in 
particular. 
George H. W. Bush proposed 
the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
among the United States, Can-
ada, and Mexico in 1990. That 
landmark agreement was the 
first to join developed and 
developing countries in a free 
trade agreement.  
One of the concerns about 
entering into a trade agree-
ment with a developing 
country was that lower 
wages and labor standards 
in Mexico would put US 
workers at risk. As a result, 
a labor side agreement was 
added to NAFTA in 1994.  
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
The TPP extends the labor 
provisions found in previous US 
FTAs, particularly in the area of 
forced labor and freedom of 
association. 
 
There is some evidence that 
labor provisions increase 
government enforcement of 
labor laws in ways that benefit 
workers in developing 
countries. 
 
There is no evidence that labor 
provisions reduce the trade-
promoting effects of trade 
agreements. 
2 Since the labor side agreement in NAFTA, 
every major US free trade agreement has 
included labor provisions. Subsequent Euro-
pean agreements also have been much more 
likely to contain labor provisions, and labor 
provisions have become increasingly com-
mon components of developing nations’ bi-
lateral and multilateral agreements. Labor 
provisions have become common in bilat-
eral and multilateral trade agreements at 
least in part because the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) agreements—which are 
multinational in scope—do not deal with 
labor standards. At the 1996 Singapore con-
ference, members agreed to recognize core 
labor standards, but, despite the declaration, 
the WTO has chosen not to include labor 
standards in its agreements.1 
Labor standards in trade agreements ad-
dress issues on the way workers are treated, 
such as rights to organize and strike, health 
and safety conditions, minimum wages, and 
working hours. They can take multiple 
forms. The most common forms include 
agreements to enforce each country’s own 
domestic labor laws, but not provisions to 
change the currently existing laws. Other 
labor provisions reference the International 
Labor Organization’s Declarations and may 
include either aspirations to comply with 
those declarations or enforcement mecha-
nisms for those cases in which the Declara-
tions are not followed.  
Over time, labor provisions have expanded 
in their ambition and coverage. While earlier 
agreements were more likely to have provi-
sions that stated aspirations to follow do-
mestic laws, more recent agreements are 
more likely to both reference domestic and 
international standards and include provi-
sions for remedies when these provisions 
are not followed.  
EFFECTS OF LABOR PROVISIONS 
There are two main questions related to la-
bor provisions in trade agreements. The first 
is whether or not they affect trade. The rea-
son this question continues to be important 
is that developing countries often object to 
labor provisions on the grounds that they 
are “protectionism in disguise” in the sense 
that they may require developing countries 
in effect to raise their labor standards to 
“level the playing field” with the developed 
countries. Developing countries have raised 
these objections specifically in the WTO. 
Raising standards may imply rising costs, 
which would reduce the cost advantage en-
joyed by developing countries. If the provi-
sions reduce trade, they might actually make 
it more difficult for developing countries to 
improve conditions through economic de-
velopment that might accompany the rise in 
trade.  
Very little research empirically evaluates the 
hypothesis that labor provisions reduce 
trade. Work in progress from the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) suggests 
Since the labor side 
agreement in NAFTA, 
every major US free 
trade agreement has 
included labor provisions 
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that the effect of labor provisions on trade is 
estimated to be zero. That is, the estimated 
effect is very close to zero and is not statisti-
cally significant. These results suggest that 
the effects of labor provisions in trade 
agreements so far have been negligible. La-
bor provisions do not seem to reduce trade. 
The second main question is whether or not 
the labor provisions improve labor condi-
tions in developing countries. Recent re-
search from Latin America finds that the la-
bor provisions are associated with increased 
government inspections, which is consid-
ered to be an important first step in the en-
forcement of domestic laws.2 The commit-
ments in the agreements to increase en-
forcement of domestic laws seems to be fol-
lowed by increased government attention. 
Whether or not this ultimately leads to im-
proved working conditions in developing 
countries, however, requires further empiri-
cal study. 
LABOR PROVISIONS IN THE TPP 
Like these earlier agreements, the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) includes labor 
provisions. The model for the TPP labor pro-
visions are often referred to as “Peru Plus” 
because they extend the labor provisions 
that were included in the U.S.-Peru Free 
Trade Agreement. Table 1 contains a com-
parison of the labor provisions in the U.S.-
Peru agreement and the TPP. The sections of 
the agreement are quite similar in the sense 
that they address similar issues. Both in-
clude provisions about following domestic 
labor laws. Text in the two agreements is 
similar if not identical regarding labor provi-
sions. A reason for the similarity could be 
because they both seem to draw information 
from and cite the ILO Declaration on Funda-
mental Principles and Rights at Work and its 
Follow-Up. 
One of the key differences is that the TPP 
includes the text, “each Party shall also dis-
courage, through initiatives it considers ap-
propriate, the importation of goods from 
other sources produced in whole or in part 
3 
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Table 1: Labor Provisions in the TPP and the 
U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement  
Source: The TPP and US-Peru FTA. 
TPP U.S. – Peru Free Trade Agreement 
19.1 Definitions 17.8 Definitions 
19.2 Statement of Shared 
Commitment 
17.1 Statement of Shared Com-
mitment 
19.3 Labor Rights 17.8 Definitions 
19.4 Non Derogations 17.2 Section 2 (Commitment to 
Non Derogation) 
19.5 Enforcement of Labor 
Laws 
17.3 Enforcement of Labor Laws 
19.6 Forced or Compulsory 
Labor 
17.8 Section (Elimination of all 
forms of forced or compulso-
ry labor) 
19.7 Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility 
Annex 17.6 Section 2 (Both par-
ties commit to promotion of 
best practices with respect 
to corporate social responsi-
bility among other things) 
19.8 Public Awareness and 
Procedural Guidelines 
17.4 Procedural Guidelines and 
Public Awareness 
19.9 Public Submissions 17.5 Section 5 (Cooperation and 
Communication Mecha-
nisms) 
19.10 Cooperation 17.6 Labor Cooperation and Ca-
pacity Building Mechanisms 
19.11 Cooperative Labor 
Dialogue 
17.5 Section 5 (Cooperation and 
Communication Mecha-
nisms) 
19.12 Labor Council 17.5 Section 2 (Council Mecha-
nisms) 
19.13 Contact Points 17.5 Section 5 (Cooperation and 
Communication Mecha-
nisms) 
19.14 Public Engagement 17.5 Sections 6 & 7 
(Communications) 
19.15 Labor Consulting 17.7 Cooperative Labor Consulta-
tions 
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Notes: 
1 For a discussion of labor standards and the WTO, see https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm 
2 Dewan, S. & Ronconi, L. (2014). U.S. Free Trade Agreements 
and Enforcement of Labor Law in Latin America (Inter-American 
Development Bank Working Paper, No. IDB-WP-543).  
by forced or compulsory labour, including 
forced or compulsory child labour.” Compa-
rable text was not found in the U.S.-Peru 
FTA. Furthermore, the TPP article on coop-
eration is much more expansive. The TPP 
also contains specific agreements for Vi-
etnam, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam to 
strengthen their domestic labor standards, 
especially in the area of freedom of associa-
tion. Finally, the TPP article on Labor Con-
sulting was much more in-depth than U.S-
Peru FTA Article 17.7. As mentioned before, 
the TPP text has to account for not just a bi-
lateral relationship, but a multi-party sys-
tem.  
TPP LABOR EFFECTS 
While some labor provisions in the TPP ex-
tend those in previous agreements, most of 
the provisions have been tried before with 
no apparent reduction in the otherwise 
trade-promoting effects of the agreements. 
It remains to be shown whether the exten-
sions significantly increase the costs to de-
veloping country factories. On the other 
hand, the provisions could increase govern-
ment enforcement of domestic labor laws in 
ways that benefit workers in developing 
countries. Therefore, it is likely that the 
global benefits of the labor provisions will 
exceed their costs. 
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ABOUT THE MOSBACHER INSTITUTE 
The Mosbacher Institute was founded in 2009 to honor Robert A. Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce from 1989-
1992 and key architect of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Through our three core programs–Integration 
of Global Markets, Energy in a Global Economy, and Governance and Public Services–our objective is to advance the 
design of policies for tomorrow’s challenges. 
Contact: 
Cynthia Gause, Program Coordinator 
Mosbacher Institute for Trade, Economics, and Public Policy  
Bush School of Government and Public Service 
4220 TAMU, Texas A&M University 
College Station, Texas 77843-4220 
Email: bushschoolmosbacher@tamu.edu  
Website: http://bush.tamu.edu/mosbacher 
The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Mosbacher Institute, a center for 
independent, nonpartisan academic and policy research, nor of the Bush School of Government and Public Service.  
To share your thoughts 
on The Takeaway, 
please visit  
http://bit.ly/1ABajdH  
